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I. Introduction 
 
“We can either have a death penalty that avoids excessive delays and ‘arguably serves 
legitimate penological purposes,’ or we can have a death penalty that ‘seeks reliability 
and fairness in the death penalty’s application’ and avoids the infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishments. It may well be that we ‘cannot have both.’”1 
  -Justice Stephen Breyer, dissenting opinion in Bucklew v. Precythe. 
 
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court ordained a fundamental tension in 
capital punishment. In permitting the nationwide resumption of executions, the Court 
established the death penalty as “an expression of society’s moral outrage,” as 
retribution for heinous crimes.2 Simultaneously, the Court attempted to create a 
reliable death penalty that is not implemented in an “arbitrary and capricious 
manner.”3 Retribution—the death penalty’s primary motivation—must be timely, 
proportional to the crime, and reflective of the offender’s culpability.4 A reliable death 
penalty, for the purposes of this paper, is broadly understood as one which does not 
execute the wrong people.5 These principles, one fundamental, the other a mandate, are 
incompatible. 
In his dissenting opinion in Bucklew v. Precythe, Justice Breyer recognized the 
incompatibility of a death penalty both retributive in nature and reliable in its 
implementation. This was not the first time Justice Breyer questioned the acceptability 
of capital punishment in the twenty-first century. In his 2015 dissenting opinion in 
                                               
1Bucklew came down during the course of this paper and is further evidence of the tension between 
retribution and reliability. Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-8151, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2477 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019).  
2 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). 
3 Id. at 188. 
4 Louis P. Pojman, Why the Death Penalty is Morally Permissible, in Debating the Death Penalty: Should 
America Have Capital Punishment? The Experts on Both Sides Make their Best Case 56-57 (Hugo A. 
Bedau & Paul G. Cassell ed., 2004). 
5 The irreversibility of a wrongful execution necessitates that this is a broad category of individuals, 
including the innocent and those of diminished culpability due to intellectual disability or mental illness. 
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Glossip v. Gross—like Bucklew, a case challenging a state’s method of execution—
Justice Breyer called for a new Furman v. Georgia, a case which, in 1972, reckoned 
with this country’s use of a death penalty riddled with fatal flaws. Doing so subjected 
him to the wrath of Justice Antonin Scalia, who scoffed at an argument he deemed to be 
“full of internal contradictions and (it must be said) ‘gobbledy-gook.’”6 
In Glossip, Justice Breyer demonstrated his distaste for the Court’s tendency “to 
patch up the death penalty’s legal wounds one at a time.”7 This tendency has birthed a 
dissonant death penalty marred by the conflict between reliability and retribution 
Breyer criticized in Bucklew. And Justice Breyer has a good bit of company in 
condemning capital punishment.  Scholars have written at length regarding the 
problems which plague capital punishment and the precipitous decline in death 
sentences since the turn of the millennium. In doing so, they have identified disparities 
in the application of the death penalty, typically focusing on racial biases, insufficient 
consideration of mental illness, geographic arbitrariness, and other systemic flaws with 
current death penalty implementation These studies also add context to the decline in 
death sentencing, focusing specifically on declining murder rates, public disapprobation 
for executions, high-profile exonerations, difficulty acquiring execution drugs, botched 
executions, and improved lawyering at the trial and appellate phases.8 Unlike these 
                                               
6 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___, 2 (Scalia, J., concurring) (2014). 
7 Glossip, 576 U.S. 1 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
8 For examples of this comprehensive approach, see Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Deadly Justice: A 
Statistical Portrait of the Death Penalty (2017); Frank R. Baumgartner, Suzanna L. De Boeuf, & Amber 
E. Boydstun, The Decline of the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence (2008); Ingrid A. 
Holewinski, “Inherently Arbitrary and Capricious”; An Empirical Analysis of Variations Among State 
Death Penalty Statutes, 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 231 (2002). 
For examples of a single- or several-state approach, see Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia 
(and American) Death Penalty, 105 Geo. L. J. 661 (2017); Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and 
Habeas Proceedings: The California Experience, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 496 (2009); Jonathan R. Sorensen & 
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studies, I focus my analysis on the general conflict which underlies the death penalty, 
that between retribution and reliability. 
Across capital punishment scholarship, there is an inclination to focus on 
nationwide trends, on a single state, or on counties that make outsized contributions to 
death sentences. Rather than engaging in a macro- or micro-level analysis, I chart the 
middle course, analyzing six states in particular: Virginia, Texas, Pennsylvania, 
California, Colorado, and Wyoming. These states run the gamut of death penalty 
regimes in the United States and correspond with the categorization of death penalty 
states put forth by Carol and Jordan Steiker’s Courting Death: The Supreme Court and 
Capital Punishment. Colorado and Wyoming represent the first category, de facto 
abolitionist states. These are states in which, though legally permissible, the death 
penalty is rarely imposed.9 California and Pennsylvania are symbolic states, ones in 
which death sentences are imposed with relative frequency but executions are rare. 
Finally, Virginia and Texas—states where death sentences and executions both occur 
with comparative frequency—are executing states. An analysis of these states using the 
Steikers’ framework serves as the foundation for my approach to the death penalty 
inspired by Justice Breyer’s Glossip and Bucklew dissents.10 Though Justice Breyer 
                                               
James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-Making in Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 
N.Y.U Rev. L. & Soc. Change 743 (1990-1991). 
9 Death sentences and executions are exceedingly rare in Colorado and Wyoming. For this reason, these 
states do not feature prominently in my analysis.  
10 I employ a mixed-methods approach comprising both jurisprudential analysis and a review of 428 high 
court opinions in Virginia, Texas, California, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, and Colorado over a seven-year 
period from 1998 to 2004.10 Brandon Garrett’s End of Its Rope database, which compiles the identities of 
all of those sentenced to death since 1990 served as my guide as I populated my dataset of 428 cases from 
my six states of interest. I chose the years of 1998 to 2004 in order to straddle the peak and decline of 
death sentencing as well as to allow a sufficient number of cases to develop their full records and reach 
their final dispositions.  
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inspired this work, it is one of his colleagues who will play a more pivotal role in my 
analysis of the modern American death penalty. 
The writings of Justice Antonin Scalia are rarely a first port-of-call for those 
wishing to see the end of the American death penalty.11 Justice Scalia was recognized 
throughout his career for his staunch support of capital punishment. Nevertheless, 
elements of Justice Scalia’s method of statutory interpretation offer strong support for 
the invalidation of the death penalty, a punishment itself full of internal contradictions. 
Justice Scalia was an outspoken and influential proponent of canons of statutory 
construction, rules governing the interpretation of the law based on common law, 
common sense, and centuries of jurisprudence. These canons were central to what 
Justice Scalia called his “neutral” method of statutory interpretation. Though a divisive 
figure, he proved to be “the most influential justice of the past two generations” thanks 
to the frequency with which his opinions were cited in the lower courts.12 Scalia, 
alongside Bryan A. Garner, authored the definitive account of these canons of 
construction in Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts.13 Canons of 
                                               
11 The exception to this rule is, of course, works that seek to challenge Justice Scalia’s unqualified support 
for capital punishment such as James S. Liebman’s The Wrong Carlos, vii (2014): “In 2006, [Justice 
Scalia] proclaimed that there has not been ‘a single case—not one—in which it is clear that a person was 
executed for a crime he did not commit. If such an event had occurred in recent years, we would not have 
to hunt for it; the innocent’s name would be shouted from the rooftops,’” quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548 
U.S. 163, 188 (Scalia, J., concurring) (2006). 
12 Richard L. Hasen, The Justice of Contradictions: Antonin Scalia and the Politics of Disruption 9 (2018). 
See also Frank B. Cross, Determinants of Citations to Supreme Court Opinions (and the Remarkable 
Influence of Justice Scalia), 18 Supreme Court Economic Review 177 (2010); Christoper E. Smith and 
Madhavi McCall, Justice Scalia’s Influence on Criminal Justice, 34 U. Tol. L. Rev. 535 (2002-2003); and 
the deluge of journalistic articles released following his death such as Politico Magazine, How Antonin 
Scalia Changed America, Feb, 14, 2016, available at 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/antonin-scalia-how-he-changed-america-213631; and 
Benjamin Morris, How Scalia Became the Most Influential Conservative Jurist Since the New Deal, 
FiveThirtyEight, Feb. 14, 2016, available at https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-scalia-became-the-
most-influential-conservative-jurist-since-the-new-deal/.  
13 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012). 
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construction have “an impressive pedigree” indeed; despite criticism that these canons 
are “mechanistic and acontextual,…Anglo-American judges have relied on them for at 
least 400 years.”14 Judges have continued to do so explicitly or implicitly into the 
modern era.15 Their continued use may well be attributed precisely to their 
“mechanistic and acontextual” nature, as canons offer guidance on more than matters 
of mere textual understanding; they guide courts on “how regulatory statutes should 
interact with constitutional structure and substantive policy.”16 Canons are typically 
deployed in those cases in which judges have no policy preferences or the areas of law 
involved are particularly complex.17 However, the canons’ ability to serve as 
indispensable tools of ideologically-neutral decision-making position them as attractive 
candidates for resolving this country’s most divisive matters of law. 
We live in an era shaped by polarized political parties and a highly partisan 
Supreme Court, an era which calls for a new judicial approach.18 Evaluating society’s 
most contentious issues of law through the apolitical lens of the canons of construction 
would represent a novel—if not refreshing—approach to law, and should serve as the 
basis for the kinds of modern reevaluations of capital punishment for which Justice 
Breyer and others call. Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner offer an outline of how this 
approach would proceed.  
                                               
14 James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral 
Reasoning, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2005). 
15 Id. 
16 Cass Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State 150 (1990). 
17 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 
Vand. L. Rev. 647, 660 (1992). 
18 Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court 
into a Partisan Court. 1 The Supreme Ct. Rev. 301 (2016) and Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, The 
Company they Keep (2019). 
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When conflicting motivations or principles threaten a statute’s validity, courts 
turn first to the harmonious-reading canon. This canon calls for conflicting principles to 
be interpreted so that they are compatible with one another, so that neither nullifies 
the other.19 It is only when a statute is so compromised as to foreclose a harmonious 
resolution that courts deploy the irreconcilability canon. The irreconcilability canon 
holds that when two simultaneously adopted principles of equal generality are in 
irreparable conflict, the statute in question must be invalidated.20 While invalidating 
capital punishment would have seemed “an unappealing course” to Scalia,21 the death 
penalty, a politically-charged issue, is a prime candidate for this neutral approach. 
Again, Scalia and Garner provide for this eventuality, ensuring us that the 
irreconcilability canon may be applied to penal statutes. They point to State v. Taylor 
as evidence of the irreconcilability canon and rule of lenity at work, citing a penal 
statute in which “one section declared it a felony to willfully and maliciously maim or 
wound someone else’s horse, and the very next section declared the same conduct a 
misdemeanor.”22 The irreconcilability canon and the rule of lenity necessitate the 
invalidation of such a conflicted statute. 
When a penal statute—such as a capital punishment statute—is subject to 
conflicting interpretations of guiding principles—like reliability and retribution—"The 
rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the 
                                               
19 Scalia & Garner, supra at 181. 
20 Id. at 190. 
21 Id. 
22 Because Taylor had broken into the building which housed the horse he maimed, he was charged with 
second-degree burglary on the basis of his intent to feloniously maim a horse. Taylor successfully appealed 
his conviction; however, the court in question overturned his sentence on the grounds that “the last words 
stand.” Scalia and Garner argue instead that—because such an interpretation does not take into account 
the rule of lenity—the penal statute should have been invalidated. Scalia and Garner supra at 191, 
quoting MO. Rev. Stat. § 1987 (1899) and State v. Taylor, 85 S.W. 564, 567 (Mo. 1905). 
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defendants subjected to them…the tie must go to the defendant.”23 Importantly, the 
rule of lenity seeks to prevent “legislative blood lust”24 which can inspire overly-broad 
or severe penal codes like those at question in Furman. But the rule of lenity is only 
invoked in certain circumstances, namely, when “a reasonable doubt persists about a 
statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative 
history, and motivating policies of the statute.”25 
The Court’s evolving capital punishment jurisprudence has left considerable 
doubt regarding whether the death penalty’s implementation meets its stated intended 
scope of only applying to the worst of the worst.26 And there is surely conflict between 
its motivating principle of retribution and the reliability mandated since Gregg; 27 
Justice Breyer’s Bucklew and Glossip dissents make this clear. If, as Justice Breyer 
suggests in Bucklew, harmoniously reconciling retribution and reliability is impossible, 
the death penalty must be invalidated, for the equally-general, simultaneously-adopted 
retributive motivation and mandated reliability of the death penalty are fundamentally 
at odds.  
I will first trace the development of capital punishment jurisprudence to add 
context to the conflict between reliability and retribution. Then, I will review the 
scholarship as it pertains to the death penalty’s flaws, reliability, and retribution. 
                                               
23 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). 
24 John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 
189, 198 (1985). 
25 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 106-108 (1990). 
26 Stephen B Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst 
Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835 (1993-1994) and Baumgartner, supra 115. 
27 Of course, retribution’s relationship with capital punishment certainly predates Gregg in 1976; 
however, Gregg plainly legitimized retribution as a justifiable purpose for capital punishment. See Justice 
Stewart “capital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.” 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 
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Finally, using state-level data, I will examine the outcomes of those states which 
emphasize reliability and those which emphasize retribution. This to advance an 
argument that the modern death penalty is so fundamentally flawed that it must either 
change significantly or be invalidated in accordance with the irreconcilability canon. 
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II.  “We Cannot Have Both” 
 
The tale of the modern American death penalty is one of landmark cases leaving 
their indicia on what—given its rarity in the Western world—can only be called a 
uniquely resilient institution. Along the way, the Court has established that retribution 
is fundamental to capital punishment while simultaneously seeking to make the death 
penalty is a reliable punishment. Capital punishment scholarship suggests that, in this 
endeavor, the Court has not succeeded. The tension between reliability and retribution 
is as strong as it ever was; the death penalty does not add up to a coherent whole. 
Though no two cases have more directly and dramatically affected capital punishment 
than Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia, a supporting cast of cases provide 
necessary context for an analysis of the death penalty and its subsequent appellate 
process. After exploring these landmark cases, I will contextualize their effects with a 
review of relevant scholarly literature. 
 
Landmark Cases 
Fourteen years before Furman questioned whether contemporary capital 
punishment comported with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, Trop v. Dulles laid the foundation for analyzing such questions. After a 
would-be World War II deserter was apprehended and stripped of his citizenship, the 
Court was asked to determine whether denationalization for punitive purposes 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Chief Justice Warren wrote for the majority 
and determined that—though denationalization was not a physical punishment—it “is 
offensive to the cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the 
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individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress.”28 In what has since proven to 
be a seminal quotation in Eighth Amendment interpretation, Chief Justice Warren 
argues, “the [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”29 Trop would later play an 
instrumental role in Furman, as the Court found the death penalty’s arbitrary and 
capricious application to offend the standards of decency of the day. It continues to 
shape our evaluation of whether punishments comport with the Eighth Amendment.  
In a 1972, five-to-four decision on three consolidated cases, the Supreme Court 
held that the imposition of the death penalty in cases of rape or murder under 
contemporary Georgia law violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment. As many state codes of the day were identical to—or at least only 
triflingly different from—Georgia’s capital punishment statute, Furman v. Georgia 
effectively invalidated capital punishment in forty-one states.  
Justices joined the majority for different reasons. Justice William O. Douglas, 
rooting his argument in the English Bill of Rights, sought to avoid “arbitrary and 
discriminatory penalties of a severe nature.”30 Justice William Brennan found death to 
be “a uniquely and unusually severe punishment…fatally offensive to human dignity.”31 
Quoting Trop, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that prohibitions against cruel and 
unusual punishments must draw their “meaning from evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”32 The death penalty, he continued, is 
                                               
28 Trop v. Dulles, 386 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).  
29 Id. at 101. 
30 Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972). 
31 Id. at 305. 
32 Id. at 329. 
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“excessive and unnecessary” and in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
amendments.33 Justice Potter Stewart, in a phrase that has since been repeatedly 
mobilized by death penalty opponents, held that capital punishment statutes were 
“cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual—[they] permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly 
imposed.”34 Justice Byron White felt the punishment was used too infrequently to 
adequately deter crime or serve as retribution.35 
 Furman dealt a major—if fleeting—blow to the American death penalty; it was 
seen as the abolition pursued through years of hard work by groups like the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund. 
Executions stopped for a time; however, it was not to last, as Furman faced significant 
political backlash resulting in the Court’s about-face four years later in Gregg. Despite 
Furman’s short shelf life, its significance looms large even today. Scholars and 
petitioners alike continue to challenge the arbitrariness and capriciousness lamented in 
Furman and debate whether the post-Gregg capital punishment statutes effectively 
resolved the concerns of Furman. 
Just four years later, in 1976, the Court made a dramatic departure from 
Furman in Gregg v. Georgia. In a seven-to-two decision, the Court held that the death 
penalty was not “cruel and unusual” per se under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
amendments so long as it is not imposed in an “arbitrary and capricious manner”36—
which was, in this Court’s view, all that Furman required in the first place. As Justice 
                                               
33 Id. at 358. 
34 Id. at 309-310. 
35 Id. at 312. 
36 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188. 
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Stewart, writing for the majority, noted, “[Furman] did recognize that death is different 
in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of government.”37 So 
long as it operated under equally distinct sentencing procedures, the death penalty was 
back in play.  
 Practically speaking, Gregg opened the door to a new wave of death sentences so 
long as they were “narrowly focused”38 and conformed to several requirements: a 
bifurcated trial, consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and 
automatic review by the state supreme court. Importantly, Gregg firmly established 
that the death penalty is a retributive punishment. Justice Stewart established that 
“capital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive 
conduct,” for “the instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man.”39 Executions 
resumed en masse following Gregg. Though the Court professed to address Furman’s 
concerns with Gregg, “virtually every academic study conducted by rigorous standards 
has found egregious failure” in ensuring that only the “most aggravated” cases result in 
the death penalty.40 This decision could have paved the way for a death penalty both 
retributive and reliable; however, its implementation since has seen both principles 
undermined. 
Since Gregg, the Court has continued to narrow the death penalty’s scope, 
seeking to improve its reliability and to make its retribution proportional to the crime. 
In 1977, Coker v. Georgia invalidated the death penalty for rape and effectively limited 
                                               
37 Id. 
38 Baumgartner et al., Deadly Justice, supra at 13.  
39 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 
40 Id. at 15-16. 
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the death penalty to just homicides.41 A year later, the Court sought to broaden the 
acceptable kinds of mitigating circumstances in Lockett v. Ohio. Lockett overturned an 
Ohio capital punishment statute which made the death penalty mandatory for all 
defendants found guilty of murder with at least one of seven specific aggravating 
circumstances.42 Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority and determined that “the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest 
kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any 
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense 
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”43 
The Court continued its attempt to clarify which murders warranted death in 
1980. Though the Court has “struggled” to establish a clear standard for the 
consideration of aggravating circumstances,44 it reaffirmed their centrality to 
determining whether a murder should be classed as a capital homicide in Zant v. 
Stephens.45 Taken together, Lockett and Zant made capital cases a battleground for 
aggravation and mitigation, for our desire for retribution and our desire to ensure that 
only those defendants deserving of the death penalty receive it. 
To this end, the Court took steps to better tailor the death penalty to only the 
most deserving criminals in the early 2000s. In 2002, Atkins v. Virginia invalidated the 
execution of the intellectually disabled. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens held that 
                                               
41 Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty in a Nutshell, 67 (2003). 
42 The statute in question would have exempted Lockett from the death penalty if  “(1) the victim had 
induced or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that Lockett would have committed the offense but 
for the fact that she ‘was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation,’ or (3) the offense was ‘primarily 
the product of [Lockett’s] psychosis or mental deficiency.’” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1978), 
quoting Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2929.03-2929.04(B) (1975) 
43 Id. at 604-605. 
44 Streib, supra at 76. 
45 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
 16 
 
the intellectually disabled “do not act with the level of moral culpability that 
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct” due to “their disabilities in areas 
of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses.”46 For this reason, executing the 
intellectually disabled violates the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. Significant to 
Atkins was the Court’s recognition of “the consistency of the direction of change” at the 
state level toward abolishing the death penalty for the intellectually disabled.47 The 
Court has traditionally responded to consensus among the states in death penalty 
cases, but in Atkins, the justices saw fit to respond not only to states, but to science.  
This was a watershed moment in capital punishment jurisprudence, a recognition that 
the execution of an individual who lacks full culpability for his or her crimes is cruel 
and unusual. Atkins was reaffirmed ten years later in Hall v. Florida, in which the 
Court broadened the acceptable evidence defendants may bring to establish intellectual 
disability. In doing so, the Court better aligned Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with 
contemporary medical understanding and society’s standards of decency. 
In 2005, the Court evaluated the relationship between mental development and 
culpability in Roper v. Simmons. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
weighed whether the execution of juveniles constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 
Justice Kennedy, quoting Weems v. United States, argued “that punishment for crime 
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”48 An evolving understanding of 
how the human brain develops and the resulting evolution of society’s standards of 
                                               
46 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002). 
47 Id. at 316. 
48 Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
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decency led the Court to determine that age—like intellectual disability in Atkins—
diminishes a defendant’s culpability for the crime he or she committed.49 
Atkins and Roper reflect the Court’s sensitivity to societal change and the 
formative role culpability plays in legitimating our desire for retribution. It is no 
coincidence that, as society has developed a richer understanding of the human mind, 
we have narrowed who is eligible to receive the state’s harshest punishment. It is not 
unimaginable that our evolving understanding of the structural prejudices at work in 
the criminal justice system and society at large will one day contribute to a wholesale 
reevaluation of capital punishment in this country. 
That wholesale reevaluation is exactly what Justice Breyer hoped to hasten with 
his dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross. Glossip was, on its surface, a case regarding 
methods of execution. Despite well-documented botched executions stemming from the 
use of the controversial drug Midazolam, the Court rejected a challenge to Oklahoma’s 
drug protocol and affirmed that the use of Midazolam—regardless of the risks of pain it 
poses—is not in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, for the purposes of 
capital punishment scholarship (including this paper), Justice Alito’s majority opinion 
is less pivotal than Justice Breyer’s fiery dissenting opinion. Due to its growing rarity, 
“serious unreliability, arbitrariness in application, and unconscionably long delays that 
undermine the death penalty’s penological purpose,” Breyer called for a reconsideration 
of whether capital punishment is per se cruel and unusual.50 The Glossip dissent has 
made waves in both the lower courts and in legal scholarship circles and represents a 
modern take on the failures of fifty years of capital punishment jurisprudence. 
                                               
49 Id. at 567. 
50 Glossip, 576 U.S. at 2 (2015). 
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Literature Review 
As the court has attempted to “patch up the death penalty’s legal wounds one at 
a time,”51 it has created an irreconcilable conflict between its two motivating policies: 
reliability and retribution. James Coleman (2015) represents the vanguard of scholars 
inspired by Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent. Coleman notes that “the death penalty is 
losing much of its allure in the United States,” a claim based both on the number of 
states opting to abolish the death penalty and the decline in death sentencing at the 
national, state, and county levels.52 Whether the death penalty is to be deemed 
unconstitutional by the Court or abolished via a constitutional amendment, central to 
its demise is the “continued erosion of public confidence in the death penalty.”53 
Coleman argues that amending the Constitution would require a “Herculean effort” and 
is an “inconceivable” avenue to abolition.54 That leaves the Supreme Court. Despite a 
decreasing number of death sentences, “more and more inmates are being removed 
from death row alive,”55 a reality which underscores the gravity of Justice Breyer’s 
concern with an unreliable death penalty and evinces the need for the Court to remedy 
capital punishment’s underlying conflict—that between reliability and retribution.  
Brandon Garret (2017) and Frank Baumgartner et al. (2017) each evaluate the 
reliability of the post-Furman death penalty. Garrett compares Virginia capital trials 
from 2005 to 2015 with those from 1996 to 2004 to determine whether twenty-first 
century changes have increased the death penalty’s reliability nationwide. He suggests 
                                               
51 Id. at 1. 
52 James E. Coleman, One Way or Another the Death Penalty Will Be Abolished, but Only after the Public 
No Longer Has Confidence in Its Use, 13 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 15, 15 (2018). 
53 Id. at 16. 
54 Id. at 17. 
55 Id. at 22. 
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that, while improved capital sentencing laws contributed to the nationwide sentencing 
decline, the lion’s share of the receding of death sentencing in Virginia and throughout 
the United States can be attributed to much-needed improvements to capital defense 
programs.56 However, better lawyer cannot compensate for all of the death penalty’s 
problems. Insufficient funding, the high-frequency of claims of innocence, the 
pervasiveness of mental illness among the executed, and the over-reliance on 
questionable testimony (such as that from eyewitnesses or informants) all “should 
continue to give pause when considering the reliability of the death penalty.”57 
Baumgartner et al. comes to a similar conclusion. He conducts a holistic 
statistical analysis of the death penalty across the country and determines that the 
modern death penalty is more arbitrary, flawed, expensive, drawn-out, unreliable,58 
and cruel than it was before Furman. The risk of executing the innocent persists, and 
“a reasoned assessment based on the facts suggests not only that the modern system 
flunks the Furman test but that it surpasses the historical death penalty in the depth 
and breadth of the flaws apparent in its application.”59 
Garrett and Baumgartner’s qualms with the unreliability of the modern death 
penalty are not recent innovations. Holewinski (2002) analyzes state sentencing 
statutes and the rates at which homicide defendants receive the death penalty to 
evaluate capital punishment’s reliability at the tail-end of its most prolific era. These 
statutes create “no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the 
                                               
56 Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty, supra at 666. 
57 Id, at 724-725. 
58 Baumgartner measures reliability as a ratio of executions to death sentences, arguing that a reliable 
capital punishment system narrowly applies death sentences and executes a “substantial portion” of 
offenders. Baumgartner, supra at 14. 
59 Id. at 351. 
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death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not,” and permit “unequal, 
arbitrary, and capricious application of the death penalty from state to state.”60  
Seeking a reliable death penalty has driven some states to tolerate decades of 
delay between sentencing and the final disposition of capital cases. Gerald Uelmen 
(2009) analyzes delays in California, a state notorious for its drawn-out appellate 
process. Uelmen calls California’s capital punishment system “completely 
dysfunctional,” a place “where most of [the condemned] will certainly die before they 
are ever executed.”61 Michael Connolly (1997) also explores these delays, focusing on 
their effects on the condemned. Citing a consensus in international law condemning 
extended delays prior to execution,62 Connolly acknowledges that direct and habeas 
review are necessary safeguards “against the risk of executing innocent persons.”63 
Despite this, a death sentence, “rather than ending the tragedy that brought it about,” 
tends to extend the trauma, taking “a great toll on the prisoner’s mental and emotional 
well-being.” States’ attempts to reduce these delays often limit prisoners’ ability to 
properly appeal relevant claims.64 However, the blame for these delays does not lie 
squarely with the states, rather, capital defenders must shoulder some responsibility 
for tactics that “are nothing more than blatant attempts to prolong the litigation 
process” and their clients’ lives.65 
                                               
60 Holewinski, supra at 231-232, quoting Furman, 408 U.S at 238 (White, J., concurring). 
61 Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California Experience, 93 
Marq. L. Rev. 496 (2009). 
62 Michael P. Connolly, Better Never than Late: Prolonged Stays on Death Row Violate the Eighth 
Amendment, 23 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 101, 102 (1997). 
63 Id. at 109. 
64 Id. at 110. 
65 Id. at 111. 
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Baumgartner, too, addresses these delays. Despite the nationwide decline in 
death sentencing, “delays increase every year, on average, and have done so throughout 
the last forty years.”66 Maher (2009) points to this sentencing decline as responsible for 
states’ improved ability to tailor capital punishment to worst of the worst.67 His 
analysis of North Carolina death sentences does, however, reveal that the reliability of 
capital trials continues to be undermined by “serious mental illness, the impact of race, 
and other issues.”68 Mental illness poses significant problems for a reliable death 
penalty. Though not problematic for the Court Atkins, mental illness can render a 
defendant unfit to stand trial, as Wilson (2016) notes.69 Wilson analyzes the execution 
of the mentally ill as a matter of international law pointing to broad condemnation of 
the death penalty in general and, in particular, for the mentally ill.70 
 Winick (2009) argues mental illness is the “next frontier” for a Court interested 
in ensuring death sentences are proportional to capital crimes and the culpability of 
those who commit them.71 Winick argues that “certain mental illnesses bear some 
striking similarities to both mental retardation and juvenile status”72—both of which 
are classes of individuals exempted from execution by Atkins and Roper, respectively. 
The execution of the severely mentally ill undermines the death penalty’s reliability, 
and, according to Winnick, frustrates retribution as well. Winnick notes that the Court 
                                               
66 Baumgartner, supra at 158. 
67 Thomas K. Maher, Worst of Times, and Best of Times: The Eighth Amendment Implication of Increased 
Procedural Reliability on Existing Death Sentences, 1 Elon L. Rev. 
95, 96 (2009). 
68 Id. 
69 Richard J. Wilson, The Death Penalty and Mental Illness in International Human Rights Law: Toward 
Abolition, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1469, 1473 (2016). 
70 Id, at 1478. 
71 Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as 
the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 785, 788 (2009). 
72 Id. 
 22 
 
has held that “the execution of a severely mentally ill prisoner may violate the Eighth 
Amendment for several reasons, including that it ‘serves no retributive purpose.’”73 
Winnick is joined in his concern for the death penalty’s retributive purpose by 
Pojman (2004) and Christopher (2014). Pojman argues that retribution morally justifies 
the death penalty. Retribution is “rationally supported” and is based on the 
proportionality of the punishment to the crime.74 Though underpinned by “a sense of 
outrage and passion for revenge,” retribution ensures “orderly” and proportional 
punishment.75 Perhaps most importantly—and in a similar vein to the Court’s views on 
retribution—because of its retributive value, “The death penalty is a fitting response to 
evil.”76 However, central to retribution is its distinction from simple revenge. 
Retributivists dating back to Thomas Jefferson have held proportionality as a central 
component of retribution, one which dictates the punishment fit—not exceed—the 
crime.77 Moreover, guilt and culpability are critical elements of fitting retribution; 
therefore, the death penalty is only morally justified so long as it does not deliver 
excessive retribution.78 Pojman does not opine on whether decades-long delays 
exacerbate or diminish retribution to an extent which challenges the death penalty’s 
retributive value.  
Russell Christopher (2014) meets the nexus of retribution and delays head on 
and demonstrates that they provoke the ire of death penalty proponents and opponents 
alike. Taking inspiration from the axiom “justice delayed is justice denied,”  Christopher 
                                               
73 Id. at 834, quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986). 
74 Pojman, supra at 57. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 56. 
78 Id. at 54. 
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represents capital punishment proponents’ exasperation with delays.79 Retribution 
offers “justification, and the most compelling justification, of capital punishment.”80 
Though Christopher does take issue with the length and irreparability of death penalty 
delays,81 his primary gripe is that “delay in the enforcement of capital punishment 
frustrates the purpose of retribution.”82 To this end, Christopher analyzes opinions 
addressing Lackey claims and evaluates the relationship between various perspectives 
on lengthy death row incarceration and retributivism.83  Death penalty delays can be 
conceived as additional and excessive punishment which overdo retribution,84 as 
extensions of life that are too lenient and undermine retribution,85 or as an unjustified 
combination of the two.86 All three frustrate retribution in one way or another, and 
suggest that delays are incompatible with the death penalty’s primary justification. 
A death penalty which prioritizes retribution over reliability—and one with little 
delay—carries with it intolerable risks. James Liebman (2002) reminds us of the 
importance of a reliable death penalty in his discussion of wrongful execution. He 
highlights two worrying aspects of wrongful executions, the first of which is the 
“substantial risk” of executing the innocent.87 Liebman cites the work of a team of 
researchers from Columbia University School of Law in claiming that—in addition to 
                                               
79 Russell L. Christopher Death Delayed is Retribution Denied, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 421, 423 (2014). 
80 Id, at 439. 
81 Id. at 424. 
82 Id. at 425, quoting Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 960 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
83 Id. at 427-428. These claims argue extended stays on death row violate the Eighth Amendment in 
accordance with Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent from denial in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). 
84 Id, at 459-459. 
85 Id, at 462. 
86 Id. at 465. 
87 James S. Libeman, Rates of Reversible Error and the Risk of Wrongful Execution, 86 Judicature 78 
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the risk of wrongful execution posed by capital punishment—it is exceedingly difficult 
to identify a wrongful execution resulting from the death penalty, an institution 
“designed to kill.”88 Capital cases are not truly concerned with determining guilt; if they 
were, notoriously unreliable eyewitness testimony would not be so readily-admitted. 
Rather, capital cases are about “the sufficiency of evidence.” That there is no 
“systematic effort to determine whether executed individuals were innocent”89 suggests 
a general indifference to innocence within the capital system. Despite the difficulty 
associated with collecting evidence of wrongful executions, Liebman points to the 101 
individuals ultimately acquitted for whom death warrants had been signed, “leaving 
the discovery of their innocence to entirely unpredictable fortuities.”90 
Capital punishment has been indelibly shaped by the conflict between reliability 
and retribution. Coleman evidences the importance of the Justice Breyer’s Glossip 
dissent, while scholars such as Baumgartner, Garrett, and Holewinski have support 
Breyer’s claims and demonstrated that the death penalty remains as unreliable—if not 
more so—as it was before Furman. Uelman and Connolly discuss the detrimental 
effects of delays in California and in the broader United States. Maher suggests that 
the sentencing decline has enabled states to narrow their application of the death 
penalty but warns that unreliability stemming from mental illness remains. Wilson 
identifies a consensus in international law prohibiting the execution of the mentally ill, 
and Winnick suggests that proscribing their execution should be next on the Court’s 
capital punishment agenda. Additionally, Winnick raises concerns about the effects of 
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executing the mentally ill on the retributive purpose of the death penalty, a purpose 
which Pojman assures us is valid and morally justifiable. Christopher argues that 
delays, too, undermine the retribution offered by capital punishment. However, 
Liebman reminds us that reliability must trump retribution, as there exists an undue 
risk of the wrongful executions.  
 The scholarship makes it plain that reconciling reliability and retribution is no 
easy task, especially since the death penalty is still undermined by serious unreliability 
and seemingly-interminable delays. More importantly, quantitative and qualitative 
analyses alike speak to the Court’s failure to adequately heal the “legal wounds” with 
which Justice Breyer is so concerned. That the death penalty remains seriously flawed 
in spite of nearly fifty years of post-Gregg reflection suggests that capital punishment is 
due a new Furman, one which benefits from the neutral analysis made possible by 
canons of construction. 
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III.  But Can We Have Either? 
 
 
Appellate Processes and Capital Punishment Principles 
Since Gregg, the death penalty has been subject to a tug of war between its 
retributive motivation and its Court-mandated reliability. The variety of speeds with 
which states finally dispose of capital cases is evidence of this and offers a glimpse into 
which principle—reliability or retribution—a state favors. States have significant 
agency in determining both the breadth of capital sentencing statutes and the length of 
capital appellate processes. It is in the latter where death’s dueling principles become 
most readily apparent. The first stage of the capital appeals process is the direct appeal 
to the state high court, a step which can take a decade or more. The condemned may 
then appeal the state high court decision to the Supreme Court; nearly all of these 
appeals are fruitless.91 Then come state habeas proceedings. As all claims must be 
exhausted in state habeas courts prior to the commencement of federal habeas appeals, 
these state habeas proceedings provide state courts and capital defenders multiple 
opportunities to extend the appellate process.  
A longer appellate process allows for the full exploration and development of 
relevant claims and evidence, but at a price: decades-long delays in oppressive 
conditions dilute the retribution central to capital punishment. These processes 
represent a prioritization of reliability over retribution. Decades of delay give the 
condemned more than enough time to develop their claims but do so at the expense of 
swift retribution. On the other hand, states that railroad direct and state habeas 
                                               
91 Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices’ Caseload, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2019). 
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appeals increase the risk of executing the innocent or those whose claims of trial error 
could, in time, result in a commutation. These speedy processes clearly prioritize swift 
retribution over the time necessary to protect against a wrongful execution. Neither 
long nor short appellate processes sufficiently comply with Gregg’s stated aim of 
reducing the problems that plagued capital punishment nearly fifty years ago. Both 
testify to an irrepressible conflict between reliability and retribution. 
My analysis of 428 death sentences illustrates the outcomes of these divergent 
appellate approaches and demonstrates that the modern death penalty is dogged by 
conflicting principles incapable of being reconciled.92 This irreconcilability invites the 
aptly-named irreconcilability canon, which calls for the invalidation of any statute 
whose competing principles cannot be harmoniously read. Both the decline in 
nationwide death sentencing and the divergent appellate outcomes experienced in the 
six states of interest reflect this irreconcilability and the challenges of implementing a 
death penalty “full of internal contradictions.”93 Figure one depicts the decline in 
sentencing from 1998 to 2004 in the six states of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
92 Cases cited from my dataset (in order of appearance): People v. Frederickson, No. S067392, 2019 Cal. 
LEXIS 8038 (Cal. Oct. 17, 2018); Masterson v. Thaler, No. 4:09-CV-2731, LEXIS 26226 (S.D. Tex. 2014); 
People v. Rodriguez, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 7633 (Cal. Jun. 21, 2006); Commonwealth v. Arrington, 624 Pa. 506 
(2014). 
93 Glossip, 576 U.S. at 2. 
 28 
 
Figure 1: 
 
 
Table one also quantifies the significant decline in death sentencing and better 
situates the six states of interest within larger sentencing trends. Both California and 
Texas play an outsized role in death sentencing nationwide and deserve significant 
scrutiny for this reason. These two states are the premier representatives of appellate 
processes which appear to prioritize reliability and retribution, respectiveley. It is for 
this reason that they, alongside Pennsylvania and Virginia, guide the rest of my 
analysis. 
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Table 1: Comparing Death Sentencing from States of Interest to Nationwide Sentencing 
 
Year CA CO PA TX VA WY U.S. 
Total 
1998 32 1 13 42 6 0 300 
1999 42 1 13 49 7 0 287 
2000 31 1 9 5 4 0 230 
2001 23 0 4 19 3 0 174 
2002 16 0 10 13 1 0 168 
2003 22 1 6 20 1 0 153 
2004 12 0 4 15 1 1 147 
Total 179 4 59 163 23 1 1459 
Percentage 
of Total 
Sentences 
12.27% 0.21% 4.04% 11.17% 1.58% 0.07% 100% 
 
 
 
 
Reliability 
 
“It won’t be over until I go to San Quentin. I want to press the button if they’ll let me.”94 
           -Kirk Wilson 
 
In 1998, Daniel Frederickson “won” what a California district attorney called “a 
lifetime achievement award” for a career criminal. Frederickson was sentenced to death 
for a routine homicide during the commission of a robbery, a robbery he planned as a 
means to return to jail. Was this the work of the worst of the worst? Kirk Wilson, the 
victim’s brother, certainly thought so, claiming life without parole would be a “reward” 
for Frederickson, and that “the only thing that will be justice for my family is when I 
can stand in a room and [Frederickson] is pronounced dead.”95 One wonders if Wilson 
                                               
94 Greg Hernandez, Store Manager’s Killer Sentenced to Death, Los Angeles Times (1998). 
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still wants to “press the button” in 2019, or if his desire for retribution has been 
tempered by the twenty-one years since his brother’s murder. Frederickson’s automatic 
appeal is not yet fully briefed as of April 2019. If swift retribution is what victims’ 
families seek, they are in for a lesson in patience. 
Delays like those experienced by Mr. Frederickson frustrate the death penalty’s 
retributive purpose. The rarity of executions and the longevity of delays in California 
and Pennsylvania speak to those states’ indifference to and attenuated relationship 
with retribution. 96 It was for this reason, among others, that United States District 
Judge Cormac J. Carney struck down California’s death penalty in the 2014 case 
Chappell v. Jones. Judge Carney wrote of the California condemned: 
Systemic delay has made their execution so unlikely that the death 
sentence carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been quietly 
transformed into one no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life 
in prison, with the remote possibility of death. As for the random few for 
whom execution does become a reality, they will have languished for so long 
on Death Row that their execution will serve no retributive or deterrent 
purpose and will be arbitrary.97 
 
Table two evidences the delays at the heart of Judge Carney’s opinion and 
summarizes the outcomes of each of the 428 death sentences analyzed in California and 
the other five states of interest. Noteworthy is that—despite having been sentenced 
between fifteen and twenty-one years ago—just over half of these defendants’ cases 
have been finally disposed. An even smaller portion—under twenty percent—have 
delivered the retribution they promised.98 Pennsylvania, though quicker to resolve 
                                               
96 California and Pennsylvania, as symbolic states, represent this form of death penalty. In both states, 
delays are long and executions infrequent. 
97 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
98 These numbers do not account for those inmates who voluntarily suspended their appeals. As such, they 
are likely lower than what they would be if I had removed those inmates who voluntarily suspended their 
appeals.  
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capital appeals, appears to be equally disinterested retribution; of the thirty-five finally 
disposed sentences, twenty-four have been overturned. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Sentence Outcomes, 1998-2004 
 
State Total 
Sentences 
Sentences 
Finally 
Disposed 
Sentences 
Overturned 
Offenders 
Still on 
Death 
Row 
Executions Deaths 
(suicide 
or natural 
causes) 
California 178 33 5 158 0 15 
Colorado 4 4 4 0 0 0 
Pennsylvania 59 35 24 35 0 0 
Texas 163 121 19 66 69 9 
Virginia 23 23 8 0 12 3 
Wyoming 1 0 1 199 0 0 
Total 428 217 1 259 81 27 
 
California is the primary offender when it comes to delays, marrying a high 
volume of sentences with an appellate system moving at a snail’s pace. Because of the 
infrequency of executions100 and the length of their average delays, California—and 
Pennsylvania, to a lesser extent—serve as the primary representatives of states which 
prioritize reliability over speedy retribution. During a period spanning the peak and 
beginning of the decline of death sentencing nationwide, California’s courts showed a 
disregard for the timely resolution of death sentences and an utter disinterest in 
executing the condemned. This raises serious questions regarding the purpose behind 
retaining what is becoming a crueler version of life without parole, one which raises 
pertinent Eighth Amendment questions given our evolving understanding of the 
                                               
99 Dale Eaton, Wyoming’s lone death row inmate, remains on death row while Wyoming challenges the 
commutation of his sentence. 
100 California’s last execution was in 2006, Pennsylvania’s in 1999. Death Penalty Information Center, 
“Executions by State and Year,” https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5741 (last visit Apr. 18, 2019). 
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detrimental effects of time spent on death row. And perhaps more importantly, these 
delays fundamentally undermine the retributive purpose of the death penalty. 
Justices have long made it clear that retribution is the primary motivation 
behind death penalty. The death penalty is a punishment derived from public outrage 
at heinous crimes and a penalty for crimes “so vicious, so offensive to society’s 
standards of decency, that they call out for an ultimate sanction.”101 Indeed, in 1984, 
Justice Blackmun declared, “the primary justification for the death penalty is 
retribution.”102 The Court has not since seen fit to advocate incapacitation or deterrence 
with the same force as retribution. Justice John Paul Stevens, who voted to reinstate 
the death penalty in Gregg, now argues that “the question whether we should retain 
the death penalty depends on the strength of the interest in retribution.” For Stevens, 
the answer is to “put an end to what has become a wretched arrangement.”103 
This desire for retribution against the accused—a desire forged in the trauma 
immediately following an atrocity—is fundamentally at odds with our nation’s interest 
in ensuring that our death penalty is reliable, an interest which has contributed to 
lengthy delays. Effective retribution does not come decades after the initial “social 
feeling of revulsion.”104 Yet, on average, the condemned spend just under eighteen years 
on death row.105 Many spend far longer than that. Eighteen years should be enough 
time for the passions fueled by a violent crime to cool and for the retributive value of 
capital punishment to diminish. 
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For more than two decades, justices have decried the delay in reaching the final 
disposition of capital cases, whether because of their cruelty or for their role in 
undermining retribution. In a 1995 dissent from denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens 
argued that seventeen years on death row constituted a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and undermined the 
death penalty’s “two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence.”106 In 2018, 
Justice Breyer echoed his former colleague, this time dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari in a case involving a petitioner who had spent forty-two years on death row. 
Breyer wrote, “more than a century ago, the Court described a prisoner’s four-week 
wait prior to execution as ‘one of the most horrible feelings to which [a person] can be 
subjected.’”107 Forty-two years is unconscionable.  
Justice Breyer is in good company in recognizing the psychological trauma 
inflicted by decades spent in the shadow of an uncertain death sentence. In her dissent 
from denial of a writ of certiorari for Apodaca v. Raemisch, a case questioning the 
deleterious effects of solitary confinement on Colorado’s death row, Justice Sotomayor 
argued that, “in the absence of an especially strong basis for doing so,” prolonged 
solitary confinement “is deeply troubling—and has been recognized as such for many 
years.”108 Sotomayor contends that the Court is “no longer so unaware” of the “immense 
amount of torture and agony which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, 
inflicts upon the sufferers,” a punishment which “comes perilously close to a penal 
                                               
106 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial) (1995). 
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tomb.”109 Justice Sotomayor makes a strong case against these delays because society 
and its courts are now well aware of the severe dehumanization that can result from 
extended periods of solitary confinement in each of the six states of interest. In 
California, the condemned spend between sixteen and twenty-three hours per day in 
solitary confinement; this is comparatively lenient. In Colorado, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
and Virginia, the condemned spend twenty-three hours per day in solitary, while in 
Wyoming, they spend all but thirty minutes each day behind bars, alone.110  
The effects of solitary confinement have led many California death row inmates 
to turn to drugs as an escape, a decision for which Nicholas Rodriguez paid the ultimate 
price. Los Angeles deputy district attorney Michael Camacho (the man who prosecuted 
Rodriguez), said “The accessibility of narcotics is rampant in the Department of 
Corrections,” even on death row.111 California never determined whether Rodriguez’s 
heroin overdose was accidental or suicidal; however, the availability and widespread 
use of narcotics on death row, where “there are many channels for contraband to reach 
prisoners”112 speaks to the despair in which the condemned spend the years awaiting 
an execution that may never come. 
These oppressive periods of solitary confinement distort the death penalty, 
shifting its punitive force from an actual execution to the seemingly-interminable time 
spent awaiting it. In Bucklew, Justice Gorsuch declared “Both the State and the victims 
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110 Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
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of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.”113 For 
Gorsuch and other conservative justices, these delays “frustrate” that timely 
enforcement. It is for this reason that Justice Gorsuch argues the answer to death 
penalty delays “is not, as [Justice Breyer’s] dissent incongruously suggests, to reward 
those who interpose delay with a decree ending capital punishment by judicial fiat.”114 
This view laments the lengthy delays which are now commonplace but places the 
blame squarely on the condemned without regard for their suffering. Scholars have 
expressed concerns about the effects of long-term solitary confinement on mental 
health. There exists “extensive empirical literature that clearly establishes [solitary 
confinement’s] potential to inflict psychological pain and emotional damage.”115 The 
condemned suffer from symptoms such as “appetite and sleep disturbances, anxiety, 
panic, rage, loss of control, paranoia, hallucinations, and self-mutilation.”116 More 
jarring still, the “effects of solitary confinement are analogous to the acute reactions 
suffered by torture and trauma victims, including post-traumatic stress disorder.”117  
Like Nicholas Rodriguez, one in four of the defendants studied had died due to 
suicide or natural causes by early 2019. These deaths demonstrate that, if four weeks 
was too long in 1890, decades or longer is intolerable in 2019, as not only are these 
deaths reflective of death row conditions, but of retribution denied. States like 
California and Pennsylvania delay death penalty proceedings for what must feel like an 
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eternity, averaging twenty-five118 and 17.49 years,119 respectively. Though these delays 
do offer more time to ensure states are not executing the wrong people, they require the 
condemned to live in unbearable conditions and serve only to undermine the death 
penalty’s retributive purpose by shifting its punitive focus from the execution itself to 
the cruel decades spent awaiting it and by rendering the death penalty itself a 
disproportionately cruel punishment.  
Trop established that society’s evolving standards of decency are foundation for 
analyzing the constitutionality of punishments on Eighth Amendment grounds. Given 
what we have come to understand about the dehumanizing effects of extended periods 
on death row, there are clear parallels between the denationalization at the heart of 
Trop and the suffering of the condemned today. If stripping one of his or her political 
identity is unconscionably cruel and unusual, what of stripping one of their humanity? 
Surely this offends our Constitution’s cardinal principles and suggests that any 
increased reliability stemming from these delays comes at too great a cost. 
The trouble is, reducing delays without significantly undercutting the death 
penalty’s reliability is no easy task. Death sentencing has ebbed to near-record lows in 
this country, yet the average delay between sentence and execution, exoneration, or 
commutation is increasing.120 In 2001 the American Bar Association called for improved 
capital defense systems to address the appalling standard of capital defense at the 
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time.121 In the two decades since, there has been widespread improvement to capital 
defense. Capital defendants now receive better trial and, crucially, appellate counsel, as 
the availability and quality of capital defenders has improved drastically since the turn 
of the millennium.122 Increased delays are part of an appellate process improved by 
better lawyering; trained capital defenders keep their clients alive for at all costs. This 
adds years to the appellate process.123  Any significant reduction in the delay between 
sentencing and execution is unlikely without an equally significant sacrifice in 
reliability.  
Post-Gregg capital punishment jurisprudence prohibits such a circumscription of 
reliability in favor of retribution. A harmonious reading of the death penalty—one 
which would enable the death penalty to continue to function as a constitutionally 
viable punishment—requires a reconciliation of these two conflicting principles. 
California and Pennsylvania are states which meet or exceed the national average for 
delays, and, in doing so, favor reliability over retribution. However, the delays 
experienced by the condemned in these states can either undermine retribution or 
make it excessive through the cruelty of life on death row. This reality highlights the 
fundamental flaws present in a delayed death penalty—even one which seeks to 
prioritize reliability over retribution—and foreshadows the impossibility of reconciling 
the conflict between retribution and reliability. 
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Retribution 
“Psychological reports describe [Masterson’s] upbringing in an abusive home where he 
was not shown much love. His difficult childhood contributed to a later diagnosis of 
‘conduct disorder, solitary aggressive type, moderate atypical personality disorder traits 
and borderline and possible atypical bipolar traits, and probable mild organic brain 
dysfunction…[these] records came before the jury, though the defense never 
highlighted their contents.”124 
 
     -The Hon. Kenneth M. Hoyt, U.S. District Judge 
 
 
Capital punishment has long been considered a means of expressing society’s 
moral outrage.125 In Gregg, the Court recognized humankind’s instinct for 
retribution and claimed that, “When people begin to believe that organized society 
is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 
‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy.”126 Appellate processes that 
swiftly and frequently execute the condemned can help to restore this confidence 
and deliver retribution, one of the death penalty’s two conflict principles. However, 
these processes come with their own costs, costs which make it clear that—just as a 
death penalty solely focused on reliability is impractical—a wholly retributive death 
penalty is impermissible. That neither a wholly reliable death penalty nor an 
entirely retributive one seems achievable suggests that the death penalty cannot be 
resuscitated by the harmonious-reading canon, a reality which calls for the death 
penalty’s invalidation.  
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Capital appeals take time for a reason: trial errors may be slow to come to 
light and appellants need time for counsel and courts to thoroughly consider their 
claims. Texas and Virginia are well-known for the speed with which they dispose of 
capital cases and deliver retribution. This speed does mitigate Eighth Amendment 
questions arising from long and cruel delays; however, in this instance, solving one 
problem begets another more fearsome concern. Namely, a speedy capital appellate 
process contributes to an intolerable risk of wrongfully executing those who would 
either be exonerated or have their sentences commuted to life. Even when Texas 
and Virginia allow capital appeals to approach the national average of 18 years,127 
we are still not sure that they get it right. This is evidenced by the cases of Richard 
Masterson, William Morva, and Alfredo Prieto. 
Richard Masterson was sentenced to death for a 2002 crime dubiously deemed 
capital murder in Texas. Masterson “quickly became a suspect” in the death of Darin 
Shane Honeycutt, a fixture in Harris county nightclubs and a man often found 
masquerading as “Brandy Houston.”128 Mr. Honeycutt was adjudged to have died from 
asphyxiation—asphyxiation which Mr. Masterson alleged occurred during consensual 
intercourse.129 While pursuing Masterson, police apprehended his nephew, who was in 
possession of cocaine at the time.130 Once Masterson was in custody, he made what he 
would later argue was a false and inadmissible confession. Masterson argued his right 
to counsel was denied,131 his confession was made in exchange for what he believed was 
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an offer of leniency for his nephew,132 and finally, that he only confessed “because he 
was embarrassed to admit that he wanted to engage in homosexual relations with the 
victim.”133 More pressing still was Masterson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
which stemmed from counsel’s failure to even broach Masterson’s extensive record and 
diagnosis of “several mental health problems.”134  
Counsel let Masterson down, but it was Texas that failed him. Not only did 
Texas courts fail to address Masterson’s ineffective assistance claims, they stood by as 
“the State affirmatively suppressed evidence” as to the credibility of the medical 
examiner conducting what was a “critically flawed autopsy examination.”135 Paul 
Shrode, the examiner in question, operated in such a way that his work could not be 
reviewed, gave “false testimony” that the victim had defensive wounds,136 and argued 
the victim had died by strangulation despite the fact that his body “showed no physical 
signs of strangulation.”137 It is no surprise that the Death Penalty Information Center 
now lists Masterson among those suspected to have been innocent of the crimes for 
which they were executed.138 Richard Masterson was executed in 2016. 
Masterson’s fourteen years on Texas’s death row make him an outlier. Table 
three evinces the efficiency with which Texas and Virginia typically dispose of 
capital cases. Death sentences in Texas and Virginia are not only more efficient, but 
more solid guarantees of execution. Texas’s 11.7 percent rate of reversals and 
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commutations is far below the national average of 42.4 percent from 1973 to 
2013.139 
Table 3: States’ Reliability and Efficiency of Death Sentencing 
 
State Percentage of 
Sentences Resulting in 
Execution 
Percentage of 
Sentences Overturned 
Percentage of 
Sentences Finally 
Disposed 
California* 0% .028% 18.54% 
Colorado 0% 100% 100% 
Pennsylvania 0% 40.68% 59.32% 
Texas 42.33% 11.66% 74.23% 
Virginia 52.17% 34.78% 100% 
Wyoming 0% 100% 100% 
Total 18.97% 14.05%140 50.59% 
 
It is worth noting that Texas’s reversal rate is, arguably, inflated. Ten out of 
the nineteen reversals analyzed came via Court-mandated executive clemency in 
the wake of Roper v. Simmons. Without Roper, Texas’s reversals would almost 
certainly decrease, as every individual convicted as a minor would have required 
relief by some other, unlikely avenue. Table four summarizes the most recent data 
regarding inmates’ average time spent on death row from state to state and 
illustrates the speed with which states like Texas and Virginia complete capital 
appeals. As is evidenced by Table four, Virginia averages just 7.1 years between 
sentencing and execution. Texas’s 10.87 years is not much better, as it takes, on 
average, 11.3 years for a wrongful death sentence to result in an exoneration.141 
Additionally, this table examines exonerations by state and casts a shadow on 
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Texas death sentences; despite few overturned sentences, Texas is the leader in 
exonerations among my six states of interest. Eight of Texas’s exonerations are 
particularly noteworthy, as they came after delays at or well above Texas’s average 
time on death row.142 The numbers make it clear that Texas struggles to reliably 
impose death sentences.  
But Richard Masterson’s case demonstrates that Texas’s reliability problems 
run deeper than just a speedy appellate process. A Texas police officer interrogated 
Masterson under dubious circumstances and elicited a questionable confession 
during an unrecorded conversation.143 Texas prosecutors advanced a case against 
Masterson that hinged on the testimony of a medical examiner the state knew to be 
unqualified.144 Texas courts allowed this to happen, and ensured that, despite 
credible claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and Masterson’s “severe mental 
illness,”145 Masterson remained on death row. And Texas executed Masterson after 
fourteen years—still four years fewer than the national average.146 
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Table 4: Average Time on Death Row and Exonerations by State 
Entity Average Time on Death Row Exonerations (1976-present)147 
California 25 years148 5 
Colorado 8.44 years149 0 
Pennsylvania 17.49 years150 6 
Texas 10.87 years151 13 
Virginia 7.1 years152 1 
Wyoming 16 years153 0 
United States 17.58 years154 164 
 
Justice David Souter offers a strong argument against the risks of wrongful 
executions posed by the death penalty in his dissenting opinion in the 2006 case 
Kansas v. Marsh: 
Today, a new body of fact must be accounted for in deciding what, in 
practical terms, the Eighth Amendment guarantees should tolerate, for 
the period starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts 
under death sentences, in numbers never imagined before the 
development of DNA tests. We cannot face up to these facts and still 
hold that the guarantee of morally justifiable sentencing is hollow 
enough to allow maximizing death sentences.155 
 
 
That Texas and Virginia’s capital appeals are, on average, completed in fewer 
than the 11.3-year average between sentencing and exoneration suggests at best 
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overconfidence in their appellate systems and at worst a disinterest in reliability. 
Texas’s high rate of exonerations should give its courts pause before inflicting a 
death sentence, as its short appellate process may not be robust enough to correct 
what could become an irreversible mistake. Likewise, Virginians for Alternatives to 
the Death Penalty said of those exonerated of capital crimes nationwide, “Many of 
these victims of a faulty justice system would have been executed before evidence of 
their innocence came to light if they had been convicted in Virginia.”156 The same 
goes for Texas. 
Virginia, too, can be accused of championing retribution over reliability. Like 
Texas, Virginia’s death penalty is marred by high-profile executions of individuals 
of limited or of no culpability. William Morva exemplifies the former category. In 
2006, Morva escaped from jail while at Montgomery Regional Hospital in Virginia, 
assaulted Deputy Russell Quesenberry, and killed Derrick McFarland and Corporal 
Eric Sutphin.157 Morva was sentenced to death. Before his initial trial, Morva was 
denied the services of a prison risk assessment expert.158 On appeal, Morva 
challenged this denial and alleged errors in jury selection.159 The Virginia Supreme 
Court was moved by neither of these claims. By 2014, Morva’s mental health—
already in question in 2009—had deteriorated significantly. Federal habeas counsel 
notes that trial counsel failed to adequately explore mitigation evidence including 
the abuse Morva suffered in jail, his upbringing, and “substantial evidence from lay 
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witnesses of Morva’s mental illness.”160 This may have been the case because even 
in 2006, Morva was delusional; had his mental illness been adequately explored or 
medicated, Morva would have likely been able to show remorse at trial and counsel 
could have provided more compelling mitigation evidence.161 
After eight years on death row, Morva showed further “signs of serious 
mental illness” that rendered him incapable of providing “any assistance” to federal 
habeas counsel and incompetent to face execution.162 Counsel requested Morva’s 
execution be stayed pending treatment which—according to doctors—could have 
increased his competency.163 Morva was denied that treatment as the United States 
District Court found his contemporary competence  “immaterial.”164 William Morva 
was executed in 2017, eleven years after his initial sentence. 
Like Masterson, Morva had more time to develop his appeals than is typically 
afforded to the condemned in Virginia (or Texas, in Masterson’s case). Like 
Masterson, Morva was executed despite a record of mental illness. Virginia and 
Texas exact retribution by railroading capital appeals through the state courts and 
by executing individuals who may not truly deserve the death penalty. Alfredo 
Prieto was another one of those individuals, and a man who has the distinction of 
being sentenced to death in California before being extradited to Virginia, sentenced 
to death again, and executed. Prieto spent his time on death row fighting to prove 
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his intellectual disability. He lost that fight and was executed in Virginia in 2015.165 
Had Prieto remained on California’s death row, he would likely still be alive today. 
The speed with which Virginia and Texas dispose of capital cases offers a 
glimpse of a death penalty which sacrifices reliability in favor of retribution. These 
states reverse rarely and execute with comparative frequency, delivering retribution 
without the requisite reliability. Richard Masterson, William Morva, Alfredo Prieto, 
and others166 make it clear that Texas and Virginia have unenviable records of 
executing the mentally ill167 and the innocent, both of which not only speak to an 
unreliable death penalty, but one which ignores the dictates of retribution: that it 
should be proportional to the crime committed and the culpability of the offender.168 
These problems—like those which plague the California and Pennsylvania death 
penalties—evidence the challenges inherent to a more retributive capital 
punishment. That both reliability and retribution states have failed to implement 
the death penalty in a way that adequately balances these competing principles 
suggests that a harmonious-reading of the modern death penalty is unattainable.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 
States across the country are responding to the death penalty’s conflicting principles 
with a force not seen since Furman. This response has ranged from the nationwide 
decrease in death sentencing, to executive moratoria, to renewed discussions in state 
houses across the country regarding the death penalty’s permissibility. Pennsylvania 
was first to act among the six states of interest. Addressing what he called “a flawed 
system that has proven to be an endless cycle of court proceedings as well as ineffective, 
unjust, and expensive,” Governor Tom Wolf imposed a moratorium on Pennsylvania’s 
death penalty in 2015.169 California Governor Gavin Newsom echoed those arguments 
in announcing a similar moratorium in March of 2019. Governor Newsom said of his 
state’s capital punishment, “It has provided no public safety benefit or value as 
deterrent. It has wasted billions of taxpayer dollars. But most of all, the death penalty 
is absolute, irreversible, and irreparable in the event of a human error.”170 
Death penalty opponents could be forgiven for deriving undue optimism from 
these moratoria; however, moratoria stand and fall at the behest of a single man or 
woman. Without judicial intervention, California’s death penalty can only be 
permanently abolished via referendum, the most recent examples of which saw capital 
punishment affirmed in 2012 and in 2016. Moreover, moratoria do little to assuage 
concerns regarding the cruelty of death penalty delays. Those sentenced to death prior 
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to the imposition of the Pennsylvania moratorium will remain on death row until their 
sentences are reversed or they die. This has not stopped the Pennsylvania Department 
of Corrections from signing death warrants for death row inmates like Lance Arrington, 
who was sentenced to death in 2000 and whose death warrant has been issued since 
2015.171 Arrington’s life is still by no means assured. His life may once again be under 
threat should a death penalty proponent assume the governorship. This knowledge 
must be unbearable. 
There is more cause for optimism in the knowledge that, as in Pennsylvania and 
California, change is coming in the remaining states of interest.172 In Virginia, the 
Republican-controlled Senate passed a bill prohibiting severely mentally-ill defendants 
from receiving the death penalty in the spring of 2019.173 Though the bill died in 
committee at the end of the legislative session, even nascent support for death 
sentencing reform demonstrates the influence of our evolving understanding of mental 
illness. Likewise, Pennsylvania’s Task Force and Advisory Committee on Capital 
Punishment recommended the state take the death penalty off the table for the 
mentally ill.174 It was the states’ repudiation of executing the intellectually disabled at 
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the turn of the millennium that prompted the Court to take up Atkins. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Stevens cited “the consistency of the direction of change” after dozens 
of states had taken steps to bar execution of the intellectually disabled.175  
Colorado also reflects this direction of change. Though there has not been a 
state-level discussion of mental illness and capital punishment like there has been in 
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and California, the jury in the high-profile Aurora movie 
theater shooting declined to sentence James Holmes to death despite his eligibility.176 
Despite having killed twelve people in cold blood, Holmes was sentenced to life after 
defense counsel presented compelling evidence that Holmes was “in the throes of a 
psychotic episode when he committed the acts.”177 Though his crimes surely mark 
Holmes as the worst of the worst, his parents capture the inculpability of the mentally 
ill in saying “He is not a monster. He is a human being gripped by severe mental 
illness.”178  
Change is coming to Texas, too. In both 2017 and 2019, the Supreme Court 
overturned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that Bobby James 
Moore was not intellectually disabled at the time of his offense in 1980. In 2017, the 
Court determined that Moore—whose thirty-nine years on Texas’s death row make 
unique in a state which typically disposes of capital cases in a quarter of that time—
had been intellectually disabled from a young age.179 The Texas Criminal Court of 
Appeals (CCA) reconsidered Moore’s status and, once again, held that he was not 
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intellectually disabled in 1980. In 2019, the Court once again reversed the Texas CCA, 
and said elements of Texas’s method of determining intellectual disability had “no 
grounding in prevailing medical practices.”180 Texas will now need to change its 
evaluation of intellectual capability in order to end its reliance on “lay stereotypes of 
the intellectually disabled.”181 
That states—whether by force or by choice—are now once again narrowing their 
capital punishment statutes to account for increased understanding of mental health 
suggests that the change to which Justice Stevens referred in Atkins has continued. 
However, the problems with wholly reliable or retributive death penalties are laid bare 
by states like California, Texas, and Virginia. Those problems ensure that the death 
penalty cannot be reconciled in accordance with the harmonious reading canon. 
Though the direction of change occurring at the state level suggests 
improvements to the death penalty are coming, there would need to be significant 
changes made in order to avoid the death penalty’s invalidation in accordance with the 
irreconcilability canon. Prioritizing reliability invites both states and capital defenders 
to delay the final resolution of a death sentence, a strategy that can have traumatic 
consequences for the condemned and undermine the retribution promised by a death 
penalty. On the other hand, prioritizing retribution is tantamount to accepting the 
intolerable risk of wrongful executions and flies in the face of our increasing 
understanding of mental illness. Therefore, a neutral approach to the death penalty 
necessitates the use of the irreconcilability canon and the rule of lenity. The tie must go 
to the condemned. The death penalty must fall. 
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 However, a death penalty truly reserved for the worst of the worst could resolve 
the conflict between retribution and reliability. The worst crimes should stoke long-
lasting desire for retribution, one which can weather the decades (if need be) of appeals 
before an execution. If the death penalty is reserved only for especially heinous 
criminals, death sentences should become rarities Capital appeals could become more 
manageable and the death penalty could regain its status as the ultimate penalty, one 
that signifies society’s universal disapprobation of an evil individual. 
 Such a death penalty may help to avoid the invalidation of capital punishment, 
but we do not have such a death penalty. Instead, states must make a choice between 
reliability and retribution. Those states which favor reliability occasion decades-long 
delays, while those which sacrifice reliability in the interest of speed and retribution. 
risk wrongfully executing individuals whose cases were indelibly shaped by trial errors, 
the mentally ill, and, at the most extreme, the innocent. Either outcome is untenable. 
It is perhaps because of this inherent tension that the modern death penalty is a 
salient and politically-charged issue. In 2018, fifty-four percent of Americans favored 
the death penalty, a metric which indicates that support for the death penalty is 
recovering after it had receded to levels not seen since Furman in 2016.182 Though 
partisan support for capital punishment has fluctuated, it is now very clearly a dividing 
issue. In 2016, the Democratic Party Platform called for the complete abolition of 
the death penalty, while its Republican counterpart claimed its constitutionality 
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was “firmly settled” and that any future consideration should be left to the states.183 
Though the punishment itself has become partisan, its unreliability and retributive 
purposes are fundamentally legal issues, and, as such, would benefit from a neutral 
analysis. And yet the Court did not apply that neutral analysis at its most recent 
opportunity to do so, when, on April 1, 2019, it handed down an opinion in Bucklew.  
Justice Neil Gorsuch announced the decision with a statement reminiscent of 
Justice Scalia’s infamous quote regarding Henry McCollum.184 Justice Gorsuch said 
from the bench, “The Eighth Amendment has never been understood to guarantee a 
condemned inmate a painless death…That’s a luxury not guaranteed to many people, 
including most victims of capital cases.”185 Capital punishment is, after all, “an 
expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”186 But evolving 
standards of decency have seen states abandon execution by hanging, firing squads, 
and electrocution in favor of lethal injection. All this to minimize cruelty. Bucklew, a 
five-to-four decision in which justices voted along party lines, bucks this trend and 
highlights the need for neutral decision-making on one of America’s most contentious 
issues. 
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The Court—a branch which, by its own admission, should seek to avoid engaging 
in “political thicket[s],”187—should embrace an opportunity to rule on a politically-
charged issues in a politically-neutral way. That politically-neutral approach is one in 
which canons of construction are lynchpins.  
A neutral appraisal reveals that saving the death penalty in its current form is 
an impossible balancing act. Taken together, the six states analyzed make it clear that 
a reliable death penalty is one which relegates retribution to a second-class concern. 
The Court has mandated this relegation of retribution, and in doing so, begs the 
question: if the primary motivation for maintaining a death penalty is of secondary 
importance, one must ask the question: Why have a death penalty at all? That fifty 
years of capital punishment jurisprudence has yet to produce a harmonious death 
penalty suggests that twisting precedents have left doing so impossible. A court 
concerned with delivering a neutral ruling must fundamentally change the death 
penalty or invalidate it. But this Supreme Court is not that court. Justice Breyer is 
right. We cannot have both retribution and reliability. Bucklew is a reflection of 
retribution triumphing over reliability and of partisanship prevailing over evolving 
standards of decency. In times such as these, the appeal of neutral decision-making is 
strong. Without significant changes, a neutral evaluation of the death penalty requires 
its invalidation in accordance with the irreconcilability canon. 
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